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I. INTRODUCTION – MICHIGAN’S EMERGENCY MANAGER LAW 
“[D]ue to the emergency conditions in the area affected by contaminated water,” 
President Obama declared a state of emergency within the city of Flint, Michigan on January 16, 
2016.
1
  This “man-made disaster,” as described by President Obama,2 was caused by the switch 
of Flint’s water supply to the Flint River and the resulting corrosion of Flint’s water 
infrastructure.
3
 Since the switch on April 25, 2014,
4
 Flint’s water has been connected to 
numerous public health emergencies- most notably high lead blood levels in children and an 
outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease.5 In his application for emergency aid, Governor Snyder 
anticipated the cost of replacing Flint’s water infrastructure at approximately $767 million.6  
Adding to the intrigue behind the Flint water crisis is the fact that all the decisions 
leading to the switch to the Flint River were not made by elected officials, but by emergency 
managers empowered by a law that had been rejected by the Michigan electorate.
 7
  The first 
“Emergency Manager Law,” P.A. 4 of 2011, was signed by Governor Snyder on March 16, 
2011.
8
 The act granted various new powers to financial managers appointed to municipal 
governments such as the power to modify union contracts, order elections to raise property taxes, 
or even to dissolve a municipality.
9
 Called an “assault on democracy” by its opponents,10 the act 
                                                 
1 Press Release, The White House, President Obama Signs Michigan Emergency Declaration (January 16, 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/16/president-obama-signs-michigan-emergency-declaration. (last visited 
May 7, 2012). 
2 WWJ Newsradio 950, President Obama in Flint: ‘This Was a Man-Made Disaster’, CBS DETROIT (May 4, 2016) 
http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2016/05/04/president-obama-in-flint-this-was-a-man-made-disaster/ (last visited May 7, 2016). 
3 Jonathan Oostling, White House to Decide Soon on $96M Flint Aid Request, THE DETROIT NEWS (January 16, 2016) 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/14/snyder-asks-obama-declare-federal-emergency-flint/78831312/ (last 
visited May 7, 2016). 
4 Mark Brush et. al., Timeline: Here’s How the Flint Water Crisis Unfolded, MICHIGAN RADIO (Dec. 21, 2015) 
http://michiganradio.org/post/timeline-heres-how-flint-water-crisis-unfolded (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
5 Jonathan Oostling, White House to Decide Soon on $96M Flint Aid Request, THE DETROIT NEWS (January 16, 2016) 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/14/snyder-asks-obama-declare-federal-emergency-flint/78831312/ (last 
visited May 7, 2016). 
6 Id. 
7 Gary Ridley, Flint Water Emails Show Flint City Council Never Approved Switch, MLIVE (Feb. 26, 2016) 
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/snyders_staff_signed_off_on_ed.html. 
8 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 4. 
9 Associated Press, Controversial Emergency Financial Manager Bill Headed to Michigan Gov. Snyder’s Desk, MLIVE, (March 
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was subjected to a referendum vote and was rejected by the general electorate on November 7, 
2012.
11
 However, by December 13, 2012, the Michigan House and Senate had both passed a new 
Emergency Manager Law, P.A. 436 of 2012.
12
 While this new act had some differences from the 
prior law,
13
 opponents protested that P.A. 436 was “substantially similar to Public Act 4 of 2011” 
and that “the new act contain[ed] an appropriation which bars any referendum.”14 Despite these 
protests, Governor Snyder signed the new, “immune to referendum,” Emergency Manager Law 
on December 27, 2012.
15
 
Without the Emergency Manager Law enabling Flint’s emergency managers, it is 
doubtful that the switch of Flint’s water supply, and the resulting emergency, would have 
occurred. While Michigan’s people were able to use their referendum to reject the first version of 
this law, the simple addition of an appropriation to the second version barred them from doing so 
again.  In fact, the Michigan Legislature has, with increasing frequency, made a habit of ensuring 
that many of its controversial acts pass with an appropriation.
16
 This practice of referendum-
proofing laws through the addition of appropriations is undemocratic and is encouraged by an 
over-broad interpretation to the appropriations exemption to the referendum within Michigan’s 
Constitution. Accordingly, this essay explores two different ways in which the people’s 
referendum power can be restored: 1) through reconstruction of the Michigan Supreme Court 
current interpretation of the referendum language or 2) by amending the Michigan Constitution.   
                                                                                                                                                             
15, 2011) http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/03/bill_expanding_emergency_finan.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
10 Chris Savage, Viewpoint: Emergency Manager Law an Assault On Democracy, MLIVE, (January 8, 2012) 
http://www.mlive.com/opinion/muskegon/index.ssf/2012/01/viewpoint_11.html (last visited May 7, 2016). 
11 Steven Yaccino, Michigan Voters Repeal a Financial Law, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/michigan-voters-kill-emergency-managers-for-city-finances.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 
15, 2016). 
12 H.R. Jour., 2012 Reg. Sess. No. 81 (Mich. 2012); S. Jour., 2012 Reg. Sess. No. 80 (Mich. 2012). 
13 Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 141.1541 et seq. (2016). 
14 H.R. Jour., 2012 Reg. Sess. No. 82 (Mich. 2012). 
15 Jonathan Oosting, Snyder Signs Replacement Emergency Manager Law, MLIVE (Dec. 27, 2012) 
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/12/snyder_signs_replacement_emerg.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
16 Zoe Clark & Rick Pluta, Why Your Vote on a Wolf-hunt Referendum Might Not Matter, MICHIGAN RADIO (Apr.12, 2013), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/why-your-vote-wolf-hunt-referendum-might-not-matter (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
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II. JUDICIAL RECONSIDERATION 
A. Current Interpretation 
The current state of the appropriation exemption to Michigan’s referendum was decided 
in the landmark case Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State.
17
 The case 
involved P.A. 381 of 2000,
18
 an act that both significantly changed the standards for attaining 
concealed weapons permits and made an appropriation of $1,000,000 to support programs within 
the act.
19
  The Michigan Constitution states than an act “making appropriations for state 
institutions” is not subject to referendum.20 Choosing to decide the case as succinctly as possible, 
the Michigan Supreme Court’s 227 word majority opinion was decided utilizing the following 
syllogism: 
(1) The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution “does not extend to acts 
making appropriations for state institutions....” Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9. 
 
(2) 2000 PA 381 states that “one million dollars is appropriated from the general 
fund to the department of state police....” M.C.L. § 28.425w(1). 
 
(3) An appropriation of $1,000,000 is an “appropriation,” and the Department of 
State Police is a “state institution.” 
 
(4) Therefore, the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution does not 
extend to 2000 PA 381.
21
 
The majority argued that its broad interpretation of the appropriations exemption was supported 
by both an “unbroken line of decisions of this Court interpreting [the] provision”22 and a lack of 
evidence supporting a different interpretation of the provision.
23
 While the language used by the 
majority opinion seems unequivocal, the three concurrences and three dissents that accompany 
                                                 
17 Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State, 630 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Mich. 2001). 
18 Id. 
19 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 381. 
20 Mich. Const. art. 2 § 9. 
21 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 305 (Young, J., concurring); Id.at 314 (Markman, J., concurring). 
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it
24
 indicate that the majority’s conclusion was just one of several that it could have arrived at. 
B. Rules of Constitutional Construction 
The “primary rule” of constitutional construction in Michigan is the rule of “common 
understanding.”25 As explained by Justice Cooley:  
the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but 
from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and 
it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in 
the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most 
obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that 
that was the sense designed to be conveyed.
26
 
This passage is cited by both the concurrences and dissents in Michigan United Conservation 
Clubs as the underlying rule for constitutional construction.
27
 Despite this passage, however, 
Justice Cooley did not completely discount the value of constitutional drafting history.
28
 Within 
the same chapter, Justice Cooley explains that when interpreting a provision, “it may be proper 
to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument” and when the 
“proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and 
satisfactory.”29 Further, the Michigan Supreme Court has also acknowledged two other rules for 
interpreting the Michigan constitution: 1) where a provision has multiple interpretations, the 
“circumstances surrounding the adoption . . . and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be 
considered,” and 2) “an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to 
one that does.”30 In short, while “common understanding” is the primary rule of constitutional 
interpretation, if the text is not clear on its face, a court may look at other factors like drafting 
                                                 
24 Id. at 298 (Corrigan, C.J., concurring); Id. at 299 (Young, J., concurring); Id. at 310 (Markman, J., concurring); Id. at 317 
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting); Id. at 322 (Weaver, J., dissenting); Id. at 325 (Kelly, J., concurring).  
25 In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Mich. 1971). 
26 Thomas M. Cooley, LL.D., A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 143 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927). 
27 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 301-02 (Young, J., concurring); Id. at 314 (Markman, J., concurring); Id. 
at 319 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
28 Thomas M. Cooley, LL.D., A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 142-43 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927). 
29 Id. 
30 In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d at 14. 
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history, surrounding circumstances, and word constructions that avoid creating constitutional 
invalidities.
31
  
C. Support for Reconsideration 
The disparate interpretations of the word “for” in the phrase “appropriations for state 
institutions” by Justices Markman and Kelly provide strong evidence that the appropriations 
exemption is not clear on its face.
 32
  Justice Markman believed that “the relevant meaning of 
‘for’ in the instant context is ‘intended to belong to” and that the majority’s interpretation was 
consistent with that definition.
33
 Justice Kelly, on the other hand, believed the majority’s 
interpretation equated “for” with “to.”34 She understood “for” to mean “‘suiting the purposes or 
needs of’” or “‘with the object or purpose of’” and accordingly believed that an appropriation 
must be “aimed at satisfying the purpose or reason for which a state institution exists” in order to 
make an act referendum-proof.
35
 Interestingly enough, the 1963 Webster’s dictionary has over a 
dozen different definitions for the word “for;” including both “a function word to indicate a 
recipient” and “a function word to indicate purpose.”36  
Considering that dictionary analysis alone cannot produce a decisive “common 
understanding” of the appropriations exemption, one must move past the face of the text in order 
to determine its intended extent.  After reviewing the drafting history, prior case law, other state 
referendum provisions, textual canons, and substantive canons; it seems that the current 
interpretation of the appropriations exemption is broader than intended by the ratifiers of 
Michigan’s Constitution.  
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d .at 315-16 (Markman, J., concurring); Id. at 326 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 315 (Markman, J., concurring) (quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991) at 519). 
34 Id.at 326 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 326-27 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary, p. 519 (1995)). 
36 G. & C. Merriam Co., Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 325 (H. Bosley Woolf et al. eds., 14th ed. 1963). I used 
the 1963 version of the dictionary because the current Michigan Constitution was adopted on April 1, 1963. Michigan, Michigan 
Manual 583 (James M. Hare ed. 1964). 
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1. Drafting History 
Justice Young’s concurrence in Michigan United Conservation Clubs, was the only 
opinion of the seven to consider drafting history.
37
 Justice Young insisted that, unless there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that the 1963 electorate meant the language to have another 
meaning, the majority’s interpretation is a “plain and natural” reading of the language and must 
be given effect.
38
 Noting that none of the dissents, party briefs, or amici curiae provided any 
historical evidence and acknowledging the “limited time constraints” in conducting his own 
historical research, Justice Young based his historical argument on the “Address to the People” 
that accompanied the 1963 constitution when it was proposed to the electorate.
39
 Finding that the 
address did not provide “any explanation” on how the referendum “limitations were expected to 
function in practice,” he found that the historical record could not support any interpretation but 
the majority’s.40 However, considering this dearth of historical research on the Michigan 
referendum, Justice Young may have come to a different conclusion had he been able to review 
the entire historical record. 
a) 1913 Constitutional Amendment 
Speaking at the January 2, 1913 joint convention of the Michigan Legislature, newly 
elected Governor Woodbridge Ferris set the wheels in motion for the inclusion of initiative and 
referendum provisions in the Michigan Constitution.
41
 Calling the initiative and referendum the 
most important tools in ensuring the rule of the people, Governor Ferris called on the legislature 
to pass a constitutional amendment giving these tools to the people of Michigan.
42
 Noting that 
                                                 
37 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 303 (Young J., concurring). 
38 Id. (Young, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 303-04 (Young, J., concurring). 
40 Id.at 305 (Young, J., concurring). 
41 H.R. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 27, 35 (Mich. 1913). 
42 Id. at 27. 
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initiative and referendum provisions in other states have been rendered ineffective due to poor 
drafting, he asked that the amendment be modeled after Oregon’s language where the 
“amendment is self-operating.”43  Accordingly, on January 7, 1913, representative Kappler 
introduced House concurrent resolution No. 21, which proposed to add initiative and referendum 
to the Michigan constitution.
44
 On March 4, 1913, the House unanimously reported the 
resolution to the Michigan Senate with no limitations on the types of laws subject to the 
referendum power.
45
 
While in the Senate, however, the referendum language was given two exceptions that 
survived into the final resolution. First, the Senate’s version included new language that 
impliedly exempted acts that have been given immediate effect.
46
 This is due to the fact that the 
language 1) allows “such acts making appropriations and such acts immediately necessary for 
the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety” to be given immediate effect and 2) 
suggests that the referendum procedure only applies to acts that are not yet effective.
47
 The 
language mirrored the pre-existing immediate effect provision, which also requires a 2/3 vote in 
each chamber of the legislature.
48
 Second, the new language included an explicit exemption from 
the referendum for “acts making appropriations for state institutions and to meet deficiencies in 
state funds” was added to the resolution language.49 Objecting to the new language, Senator 
James stated that the “exemption[s] would leave a loophole by which the whole purpose of the 
referendum might be defeated” and worried that a future legislature might exploit the exemptions 
to “defeat the will of the people by attaching a small appropriation or calling a bill a measure for 
                                                 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 76. 
45 Id. at 698-700. 
46 S. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 813 (Mich. 1913). 
47 Id. 
48 Mich. Const. of 1908, art. 5, § 21. 
49 S. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 812-13 (Mich. 1913). 
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the preservation of the public health, peace or safety.”50 Despite these concerns, on March 13, 
1913, Senator James and the rest of the Senate unanimously passed the amendment language 
with both of these exemptions to the referendum power.
51
  The House adopted the Senate’s 
language on the same day.
52
 On April 7, 1913, the people of Michigan adopted the initiative and 
referendum by a vote of 219,907 to 152,388.
53
  
b) Referendum-Proofing from 1913-1961 
In the years after the adoption of the referendum, it seems that many of Senator James’s 
concerns regarding the possibility of the legislature exploiting the referendum exemptions came 
true. While the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that both acts given immediate effect and 
acts appropriating funds are not subject to the people’s referendum power,54 the far more popular 
method of referendum-proofing legislation was through giving them immediate effect.
55
 In order 
to suit their purposes, legislators would regularly stretch meaning of the “public peace, health or 
safety” requirement of the immediate effect clause in order to give their acts immediate effect.56 
As a result, from 1913 to 1961, nearly a third to a half of all legislation passed with immediate 
effect and the referendum was exercised by the people only nine times.
57
 
c) 1961-62 Constitutional Convention 
On April 3, 1961, the people of Michigan voted in favor of authorizing a constitutional 
                                                 
50 H. H. Tinkham, Short Ballot and Recall Measures Pass the Senate: Initiative and Referendum Favorably Considered by 
Members of the Upper House, The State Journal, March 13, 1913, at 3. 
51 Michigan, Journal of the Senate 836-840 (Dennis E. Alward ed. 1913). 
52 Michigan, Journal of the House of Representatives 921 (Charles S. Pierce ed. 1913). 
53 Michigan, Michigan Official Directory and Legislative Manual 56 (Coleman C. Vaughan ed. 1916). 
54 See Thompson v. Vaughan, 159 N.W. 65, 68 (Mich. 1916) and Detroit Automobile Club v. Deland, 203 N.W. 529, 530 (Mich. 
1925). 
55 Daniel S. McHargue, Direct Government in Michigan: Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Amendment, and Revision in the 
Michigan Constitution 19-20 (Constitutional Convention Preparatory Comm’n ed., 1961). 
56 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2954-55 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
57 Daniel S. McHargue, Direct Government in Michigan: Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Amendment, and Revision in the 
Michigan Constitution 19-20 (Constitutional Convention Preparatory Comm’n ed., 1961). 
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convention to draft a new constitution.
58
 In order to prepare the delegates of this convention, the 
Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission (“CCPC”) produced numerous studies on 
the different topics and problems that could be taken up at the convention.
59
 One such study, on 
direct government in Michigan, detailed the widespread use of the immediate effect clause and 
its impact on preventing referendums.
60
 It seems that this information guided the decision 
making of the convention delegates. 
When the convention delegates took up discussion on the immediate effect clause, for 
example, a primary concern of the delegates was to end the legislature’s “abuse” of the 
immediate effect clause.
61
 In one particularly important exchange, Delegate Hutchinson 
proposed ending the legislature’s stretching of the appropriation and public peace, health, or 
safety requirements by removing them from the immediate effect clause all together, arguing that 
a 2/3’s vote requirement would be enough of a safeguard.62 In response, Delegate Kuhn said that 
such a change would “[do] away with the right of initiative or referendum” because it would 
further broaden the types of legislation that could be made referendum-proof through immediate 
effect.
63
 Acknowledging that the current constitution prevented acts given immediate effect from 
being subject to referendum, Delegate Hutchinson argued that it didn’t have to be that way – “the 
right of the people to a referendum on a legislative act could be exercised if the constitution so 
provided, even though an act had been given immediate effect.”64 Accordingly, when the 
committee on style and drafting returned the referendum language to the convention floor, 
amendments had been made to allow for acts with immediate effect to be subject to the 
                                                 
58 Michigan, Michigan Manual 72 (James M. Hare ed. 1964). 
59 Daniel S. McHargue, Direct Government in Michigan: Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Amendment, and Revision in the 
Michigan Constitution iii (Constitutional Convention Preparatory Comm’n ed., 1961). 
60 Id. at 19-20. 
61 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2954-55 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
62 Id.at 2955. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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referendum.
65
 
While the primary concern of convention delegates was to remove language of a “purely 
legislative character” from the referendum language,66 the delegates’ discussions provide 
substantial evidence that the delegates believed the provision should be self-executing and free 
from impairment by the legislature. For instance, when the committee on legislative powers first 
introduced the committee’s draft of the referendum language, committee chairman Hoxie 
indicated that it was the intent of the committee that the “section [be] self executing and [that] 
the legislature cannot thwart popular will.”67 Committee member Kuhn added that while “we did 
cut out many, many words . . . we left it so it would be self executing and so it would be 
strong.”68  
Further, these concerns also surfaced in another exchange regarding an amendment that 
would have the legislature designate an official to receive referendum petitions.
69
  Some 
delegates expressed concern that the amendment would empower the legislature to undermine 
the provision by deliberately failing to act.
70
 Delegate Nord argued that “the theory behind this 
initiative and referendum is that [the people] want to be absolutely certain that it is to be self 
executing and that it is not indispensable that the legislature do anything.”71 Delegate Norris 
further asserted that “[o]ne can foresee occasion when considerable difference between the 
legislature and the people may exist” and that by utilizing such “uncertain language,” “the 
legislature may defeat the will of the people.”72 Attempting to alleviate these concerns, Delegate 
Hutchinson noted that a statute already exists delegating an official to receive petitions and that it 
                                                 
65 Id. at 3049. 
66 Id.at 2392. 
67 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2392 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
68 Id.at 2394. 
69 Id.at 2393 
70 Id.at 2393. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.at 2928. 
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would be “the height of suspicion and distrust of the legislature, if [we] wouldn’t even leave to 
the legislature this responsibility.”73  After the amendment was adopted, Delegate Kuhn further 
reassured Delegate Nord that “no one on the committee has any idea that this will not be a self 
executing proposal” and that if the legislature did deliberately fail to designate an official, he 
would like the courts to empower the Secretary of State to receive the petitions.
74
 
d) Historical Record Analysis 
After reviewing the full historical record, it seems that Justice Young, and the other 
justices in the majority, missed a lot of the evidence supporting a more narrow interpretation of 
the appropriations exemption. While Justice Young did cite to the record of the 1961-62 
constitutional convention, and was the only Justice to do so, he did not cite to any of the CCPC’s 
reports or to the convention discussions regarding the immediate effect clause or the amendment 
granting the legislature the power to designate the receiver of petitions.
75
 Further, none of the 
Justices looked at or discussed the drafting history of the 1913 amendment.  Considering that the 
court has bound itself to follow the precedent arising from the 1913 amendment,
76
 it follows that 
the legislative history of the 1913 amendment would also be relevant in determining the 
appropriations exemption’s meaning. 
In retrospect, it seems that there is more evidence to refute the majority’s interpretation 
than to support it.  First, when proposing the addition of initiative and referendum to Michigan’s 
constitution, Governor Ferris specifically mentioned that he did not want to model after states 
that have initiative and referendum but where “the system is ineffective because of some ‘joker’ 
                                                 
73 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2393 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
74 Id.at 2393-94. 
75 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 304 n. 10 (Young, J., concurring). 
76 Riley, 218 N.W. at 148. 
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inserted into the amendment.”77 Second, while some legislators worried that “the whole purpose 
of the referendum might be defeated” by the immediate effect and appropriations exemptions in 
the 1913 amendment,
78
 these concerns must have been assuaged as the language was approved 
by the legislature with near unanimity.
79
 Third, considering that the delegates of the 1961-62 
convention knew that the immediate effect exemption had become the most common method of 
referendum-proofing legislation,
80
 their decision to remove this exemption from the constitution 
demonstrates an intent to protect the referendum.
81
 Finally, throughout the convention, multiple 
delegates expressed their intent that the referendum section be “self executing”82 and not able to 
be thwarted by the legislature.
83
 Delegate Kuhn even went so far to assert that, should the 
legislature attempt to deliberately thwart the referendum, the courts should interpret the 
referendum provision to keep it self-executing.
84
 
2. Case Law 
The 1913 amendment exempted “acts making appropriations for state institutions and to 
meet deficiencies in state funds” from being subject to the people’s referendum power.85 The 
1963 constitution adopted these exemptions almost identically except it replaced the word “and” 
with “or.”86  Regardless of this wording change, however, the clause has always been interpreted 
by Michigan courts to provide two different avenues for an act to become exempt from 
                                                 
77 H.R. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 27 (Mich. 1913). 
78 H. H. Tinkham, Short Ballot and Recall Measures Pass the Senate: Initiative and Referendum Favorably Considered by 
Members of the Upper House, The State Journal, March 13, 1913, at 3. 
79 S. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 836-40 (Mich. 1913); H.R. Jour., 1913 Reg. Sess. 921 (Mich. 1913). 
80 Daniel S. McHargue, Direct Government in Michigan: Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Amendment, and Revision in the 
Michigan Constitution 19-20 (Constitutional Convention Preparatory Comm’n ed., 1961). 
81 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2955, 3049 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
82 Id. at 2392-94. 
83 Id. at 2392-94, 2928, 2955. 
84 Id. at 2393-94. 
85 Mich. Const. of 1908, art. 5, § 1 (1913). 
86 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9. 
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referendum – the appropriations exemption and the deficiencies in state funds exemption.87 For 
now this essay will examine the appropriation’s exemption precedent. 
Before Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the only cases to take up the 
“appropriations for state institutions” exemption were the five “gas tax cases.”88 Citing these 
cases, the majority in Michigan United Conservation Clubs asserted that its conclusion is 
consistent with “an unbroken line of decisions of this Court.” 89 However, neither the majority 
nor the concurring opinions do much to explain this assertion. Only Justice Markman cited these 
cases in his opinion and he did so to make two assertions: 1) that the framers of the 1963 
constitution did not explicitly overrule the “gas tax” cases and 2) that Detroit Automobile Club v. 
Deland “merely stands for the proposition that the Michigan Highway Department is a ‘state 
institution.’”90 Upon further review of these cases however, it seems that the “gas tax” cases 
provide more support for a narrow interpretation of the appropriations exemption than what the 
majority was willing to admit.  
Deland, the first of the “gas tax” cases, involved a referendum petition against an act that 
levied a 2 cent per gallon tax on gasoline and appropriated the proceeds to the state highway 
department.
91
 Despite Justice Markman’s attempt to limit Deland,92 the Deland majority 
explicitly stated that “[t]he question is not solely whether the highway department may be 
correctly termed a state institution, but rather whether, in view of the functions which it exercises, 
                                                 
87 Deland, 203 N.W. at 529. 
88 See County Rd. Ass’n v. Board  of State Canvassers, 282 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1979); Boards of County Rd. Comm’rs of Van 
Buren et al. Counties v. Riley, 218 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1974); Good Raods Federation v. State Bd. Of Canvassers, 53 N.W.2d 
481 (Mich. 1952); Moreton v. Haggerty, 216 N.W 450 (Mich. 1927); Deland, 203 N.W. at 529. The cases are named as such 
because they all involve referendums of acts that increase gasoline taxes and appropriate money to support road construction and 
maintenance. 
89 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298. 
90 Id. at 314-15 (Markman, J., concurring). 
91 Id.at 529-30. 
92 Id. 
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it comes within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution.”93 Further noting that the 
purpose of the exemption is to “enable the state to exercise its various functions free from 
financial embarrassment” the court considered the appropriation and the functions of the 
highway department in light of that purpose.
94
 The court looked at several factors: 1) whether the 
department exercised state functions, 2) if it was created for that purpose, and 3) whether the 
appropriation was necessary for it “to carry on its activities.”95 Defining “state institutions” to 
include “all organized departments of the state to which the Legislature had delegated or should 
delegate the exercise of state functions,” the court found that the highway department fit this 
definition.
96
 In making this conclusion, the court noted that “[w]ithout the money appropriated 
by this act for its immediate use, [the highway department] would cease to function.”97  
The remaining “gas tax” cases built on the foundation laid out by Deland. In Moreton, 
the court extended the definition of “state institutions” to include political subdivisions, such as 
counties and cities, which carry out state functions.
98
 The court reasoned that while political 
subdivisions are not typically state institutions, in this case the “appropriations were made to 
enable [the counties] to function [as state institutions] . . . and, being made for that purpose, they 
are not subject to referendum.”99 Further, while the remaining three “gas tax” cases primarily 
considered, and answered affirmatively, the question of whether the appropriations exemption 
applied to acts passed in pari materia with other legislation that did fit the exemption,
100
 it must 
                                                 
93 Deland, 203 N.W. at 530 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Moreton v. Haggerty, 216 N.W. 450, 453 (Mich. 1927). 
99 Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
100 Michigan Good Roads Federation v. Alger, 53 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Mich. 1952); Boards of County Road Commissioners of 
Van Buren et al. Counties v. Riley, 218 N.W.2d 144, 148-49 (Mich. 1974); County Road Ass’n v. Board of State Canvassers, 282 
N.W.2d 774, 780 (Mich. 1979). 
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be noted that the Deland reasoning is quoted verbatim in both Alger and County Road Ass’n.101 
Finally, in Riley, the court made sure to note that, without the appropriation, the highway fund 
would not be able “to finance previously authorized and contemplated programs.102  
While the majority in Michigan United Conservation Clubs was correct that all five “gas 
tax” cases found their acts in question to be exempt from the referendum,103 the majority misses 
the fact that all five cases took consideration of the purpose and significance of the appropriation 
to the state institution.
104
  Further, there are several takeaways from the “gas tax” cases which 
suggest a more narrow interpretation of the appropriations exemption than the one arrived at by 
the Michigan United Conservation Clubs majority. First, that the determination of a state 
institution is done by considering the state functions which it carries out.
105
  Even non-state 
entities can become state institutions if they are carrying out a state function.
106
 Second, that the 
appropriation within an exempt act must be one that supports the continuance of the state 
function.
107
 Third, and finally, that the size of the appropriation may be relevant in determining 
whether the appropriation supports the state function.
108
 
3. Other State Comparison 
Comparing Michigan’s referendum exemption language to other states can be a helpful, 
though non-binding, tool for interpreting the language’s meaning. Though Justice Kelly 
compares Michigan’s provision to Arizona’s in her dissent,109 for the most part comparison 
analysis with the other states is ignored within the opinions of Michigan United Conservation 
                                                 
101 See County Road Ass’n, 282 N.W.2d at 777; Alger, 53 N.W.2d at 484. 
102 Riley, 218 N.W.2d at 148. 
103 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 328. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
104 Deland, 203 N.W. at 530; County Road Ass’n, 282 N.W.2d at 777; Alger, 53 N.W.2d at 484; Moreton, 216 N.W. at 453; 
Riley, 218 N.W.2d at 148. 
105 Deland, 203 N.W. at 530. 
106 Moreton, 216 N.W. at 453. 
107 Deland, 203 N.W. at 530; Riley, 218 N.W.2d at 148. 
108 Deland, 203 N.W. at 530. 
109 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 327, 330. 
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Clubs.  After reviewing the provisions of other states, it seems that Michigan is unique for how 
broadly it has tailored its appropriations exemption. 
Twenty-two states other than Michigan have constitutional provisions allowing for 
popular referendum.
110
 Of those states, five have no limitation whatsoever one the types of 
legislation can be subject to the referendum.
111
 Four have referendum limitations, such as 
immediate effect or public safety exceptions, but do not have an appropriations exception.
112
 
Five more states have an appropriation exemption, but the language is not referenced often due 
to other constitutional provisions which provide an easier method of referendum-proofing.
113
 The 
remaining eight states have appropriations exceptions and, on their face, generally fit into one of 
three categories when compared to Michigan’s language: those that are 1) facially broader, 2) 
facially narrower, and 3) facially similar to Michigan’s appropriations exemptions.  Closer 
examination of the constitutional language used by these eight states can provide a better 
understanding of how Michigan’s provision should be interpreted. 
The two states with facially broad appropriations exemptions, Alaska and Montana, both 
exempt “appropriations,” without qualification, from being subject to the referendum.114  
Specifically, Alaska’s constitution states that “[t]he referendum shall not be applied . . . to 
appropriations” and Montana’s states that “[t]he people may approve or reject by referendum any 
act of the legislature except an appropriation of money.
115
  Despite the broad language, however, 
the courts in each state has construed the language in these provisions in a limited way. In 
Alaska, the term “appropriation,” in the context of the referendum’s purpose, has been 
                                                 
110 M. Dane Waters, Initiative and Referendum Almanac 12 (2003). 
111 These five states are Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon. See Id. at 77-78, 183, 296-97, 326-27, 371. 
112 These four states are Maine, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. See Id. at 208, 336, 349, 401. 
113 These five states are Colorado, New Mexico, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. See Id. at 312-13, 393, 434-35, 446-
47 and Cavanaugh v. State, Dept. of Social Services, 644 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982). 
114 See Alaska. Const. art. 11, § 7 and Mont. Const. art. 3, § 5. 
115 Id. 
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“construed to refer only to annual spending decisions.”116 Similarly, in Montana, the definition of 
an appropriation is “quite limited” and “refers only to the authority given to the legislature to 
expend money from the state treasury.”117 So, while the face of these constitutional provisions 
suggest broad exemptions, the courts in both of these states have interpreted to be much 
narrower. 
The facially narrow states, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Nebraska, limit the 
extent of their appropriations exemption to only general or recurring appropriations.
118
  While 
California, Massachusetts, and Maryland limit their exemptions in this way explicitly,
119
 
Nebraska’s language was interpreted this way by its Supreme Court.120 Specifically, the 
Nebraska constitution exempts acts “making appropriations for the expense of the state 
government or a state institution existing at the time of the passage of such act.”121 
Understanding that this language should be “given a strict construction in light of the 
fundamental purpose of the referendum,” the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the exception 
to only apply to “ordinary running expenses of the state government and existing state 
institutions” and does not include new appropriations.122  As one can see, these states provide 
examples of some of the most narrow appropriation exceptions in the nation. 
The final two states, Arizona and Missouri, have appropriation exemption provisions that, 
like Michigan’s, exempt appropriations for state institutions.123 Arizona’s constitution exempts 
laws “for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 
                                                 
116 Alaska Legislative Council ex rel. Alaska State Legislature v. Knowles, 86 P.3d 891, 894 n. 17 (Alaska 2004). 
117 Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486, 491 (Mont. 1994). 
118 M. Dane Waters, Initiative and Referendum Almanac 110, 214-15, 223, 284-85 (2003). 
119 Id. at 110, 214-15. 
120 Lawrence v. Beermann, 222 N.W.2d 809, 810 (Neb. 1974). 
121 Neb. Const. art. 3, § 3. 
122 Lawrence, 222 N.W.2d at 810. 
123 M. Dane Waters, Initiative and Referendum Almanac 56, 225 (2003). 
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institutions” from the referendum.124  Similarly, Missouri’s constitution excludes “laws making 
appropriations . . . for the maintenance of state institutions.”125 Unfortunately, it seems that only 
Arizona’s Supreme Court has done much to interpret its provision. Determining what it means 
for an act to be “for the support and maintenance” of a state institution, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that this question turns on whether the funds are “use[d] in carrying out the objects 
and functions of the department.”126 Missouri’s courts, on the other hand, have only gotten as far 
as determining that an act creating a tax whose proceeds are appropriated by the state 
constitution is not referendum proof.
127
  
In summary, it seems that Michigan’s construction of its appropriation exemption is 
unique in comparison to the other states.  While a good number of states have no referendum 
exemptions whatsoever, others have adopted so many as to render their referendum provisions 
ineffective.  For those states where their appropriations exemptions are relevant, it seems that the 
majority have interpreted their provisions in a narrow manner so as to protect the people’s 
referendum. 
4. Textual Canons 
The textual canons of construction provide another set of tools for understanding the 
meaning of the appropriations exemption.  While these canons may not necessarily apply to 
constitutional construction,
128
 it is notable that Justice Young utilizes textual canons in his 
concurrence.
129
 For example, Justice Young uses the presumption against surplusage
130
 and the 
                                                 
124 Ariz. Const. art. 4, §1, cl. 3. 
125 Mo. Const. art. 3, § 52(a). 
126 Garvey v. Trew, 170 P.2d 845, 848 (Ariz. 1946). 
127 Heinkel v. Toberman, 226 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (Mo. 1950). 
128 In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d at 14 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)) (Holding that technical rules of 
statutory construction do not apply to constitutional construction). 
129 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 305-308 (Young, J., concurring). 
130 SURPLUSAGE CANON, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“if possible, every word and every provision in a legal 
instrument is to be given effect”). See also Whitman v. City of Burton, 831 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Mich. 2013). 
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presumption of consistent usage
131
 canons to dispute Justice Cavanagh’s assertion that the term 
“appropriation” was intended to mean “general appropriations bills containing substantial grants 
to state agencies.”132 Justice Young argues that if the framers intended the referendum exemption 
to apply only to general appropriations, they would have used language similar to that used in 
Article 4, § 31, which actually uses the phrase “general appropriations,” or they would have 
provided some explanation in the Address to the People.
133
 Noting that the framers did neither of 
these things, Justice Young argues that the broad interpretation of the appropriations exemption 
is justified.
134
 
However, viewing the use of the term “appropriation” in the full context in the Michigan 
Constitution, the surplusage and consistent usage canons can be found to support a narrower 
interpretation of the appropriations exemption.  The “general appropriations” described in Art. 4, 
§ 31 of the Michigan Constitution, refer to the large appropriations acts proposed at the 
beginning of each year and involves all the appropriations set forth in the yearly budget.
135
 Since 
the appropriations exemption does not use the phrase “general appropriation,” Justice Young was 
right to conclude that “appropriations for state institutions” must have a different, and more 
broadly construed meaning than the “general appropriations” in Art. 4, § 31.136  However, Justice 
Young failed to consider the “bill appropriating money” exemption to the legislative referendum 
within Art. 4, § 34. Under this section, the state legislature may propose bills to the general 
electorate so long as they are not a “bill appropriating money.”137 The majority interpretation 
within Michigan United Conservation Clubs gives the “appropriations for state institutions” 
                                                 
131 PRESUMPTION OF CONSISTENT USAGE, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“a word or phrase is presumed to bear 
the same meaning throughout a text, esp. a statute, unless a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning”). 
132 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 307-08 (Young, J., concurring); Id. at 321 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 308 (Young, J., concurring); Mich. Const. art. 4 § 31. 
134 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 308. 
135 Mich. Const. art. 4, § 31. 
136 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 308. 
137 Mich. Const. art. 4, § 34.  
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phrase within Art. 2, § 9 essentially the same meaning as the “bill appropriating money” phrase 
within Art. 4, § 34.
138
 For the court’s interpretation to adhere to the surplusage and consistent 
usage canons, it must give the appropriations exemption a meaning that is both broader than the 
“general appropriation bill” described in Art. 4, §31 and narrower than the “bill appropriating 
money” described in Art. 4, § 34.139 
Another textual canon which supports a narrower interpretation of the appropriations 
exemption is noscitur a sociis.
140
 Utilizing this canon, one can read the appropriation exemption 
together with the “deficiencies in state funds” exemption to conclude that both exemptions are 
similarly limited.
141
 The extent of the “deficiencies in state funds” exemption is was decided in 
Kuhn v. Department of Treasury.
142
 The act in question, the Michigan Income Tax Act of 1967, 
did not appropriate funds but stated that its purpose was to meet anticipated deficiencies in state 
funds.
143
 In deciding the case, the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of the “deficiencies in 
state funds” exemption.144 Finding it “inescapable” that the clause “refers only to such 
deficiencies as exist at the time of passage of [an] Act,” the court found that the anticipated 
deficiencies referred to in the Michigan Income Tax Act did not exempt the act from 
referendum.
145
 Considering that the Michigan Supreme Court placed a temporal limitation on the 
“deficiencies in state funds” exemption,146 utilizing nocitur a sociis, it follows that a similar 
limitation should be placed on the appropriations exemption. 
5. Substantive Canons 
                                                 
138 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298; Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9; art. 4, § 34. 
139 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9; art. 4, §§ 31, 34. 
140 NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“the meaning of an unclear word or phrase . . . should be 
determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”). 
141 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9. 
142 Kuhn v. Department of Treasury, 183 N.W.2d 796, 799-800 (Mich. 1971). 
143 Id. at 798. 
144 Id. at 799-800. 
145 Id. at 800. 
146 Id. 
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Substantive canons of interpretation can help with interpreting constitutional language. 
The Michigan Supreme Court has previously acknowledged a substantive canon relating to the 
referendum in Kuhn.
147
 In this case the court found that “constitutional provisions by which the 
people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed” and, in 
turn, opted to narrowly interpret the “deficiencies in state funds” exemption to the referendum.148 
Other states, such as Alaska, Arizona, and Nebraska, have also used similar versions of this 
canon to narrowly interpret their referendum exemptions.
149
 However, despite the adoption of 
this canon in Michigan and similarly situated states, only the Cavanagh and Kelly dissents in 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs made reference to it.
150
 It is not clear if those in the 
majority intended to overturn this substantive canon, but it is clear that their broad 
conceptualization of the appropriations exemption does not serve to preserve the people’s 
referendum. 
6. Presumption Against Invalidation 
The presumption against constitutional invalidation states that “an interpretation that does 
not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does.”151 In his concurrence in 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Justice Young argued that the majority has only given the 
exemption its “natural import” and has not invalidated the referendum provision.152 However, 
looking at the practical effect the majority’s decision has had on the referendum, it is difficult to 
conclude that the referendum provision that was ratified in 1963 is still in effect today. 
                                                 
147 Kuhn, 183 N.W.2d at 799-800. 
148 Id.  
149 See City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Alaska 1991) (“[T]he general rule 
that the initiative power will be construed broadly should control in the repeal context.”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima 
County, 811 P.2d 22, 27 (Ariz. 1991) (Holding that legislative review by the people is strongly encouraged by the Arizona 
Constitution); Lawrence, 222 N.W.2d at 810 (Holding that exemption language “should be given a strict construction in light of 
the fundamental purpose of the referendum”). 
150 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 321 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); Id. at 327 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
151 In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d at 14. 
152 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 303 n. 9 (Young, J., concurring). 
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Instead of a people’s check on the legislature intended by the drafters and ratifiers of the 
1963 constitution,
153
  the majority’s interpretation has resulted in a limited referendum power 
which “exists at the Legislature’s pleasure.” 154 The Michigan “Legislature now regularly makes 
its controversial work immune to referendums” through the addition of appropriations.155 
Further, the Michigan constitution already provides for a statutory referendum initiated by the 
legislature in Article 4, § 34.
156
 Instead of avoiding the creation of a constitutional invalidity,
157
 
the majority seems to have invalidated the people’s referendum and replaced it with a modified 
legislative referendum. 
Another argument made by Justices Corrigan and Young in their concurrences is that the 
people’s power to reject offensive laws has not been invalidated because the initiative, which 
does not have the same exemptions, is a viable alternative.
158
 This assertion, however, ignores 
the substantial differences in the operation of the initiative and referendum procedures. First, the 
initiative requires 60% more valid petition signatures than a referendum.
159
 Second, proponents 
of a referendum need only win a “no vote” to be successful while proponents of an initiative 
need to win a “yes vote” to succeed.160  This difference is significant when taking status quo bias 
into account.
161
 In elections where voters are given a choice between “yes” or “no,” voters, 
particularly less informed voters, are significantly more likely to vote “no” than “yes.”162 This is 
because a “yes” vote represents an uncertain change while a “no” vote is perceived to maintain 
                                                 
153 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2394 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964). 
154 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 321 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
155 Zoe Clark & Rick Pluta, Why Your Vote on a Wolf-hunt Referendum Might Not Matter, MICHIGAN RADIO (Apr.12, 2013), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/why-your-vote-wolf-hunt-referendum-might-not-matter (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
156 Mich. Const. art. 4 § 34. 
157 In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d at 14. 
158 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298 (Corrigan, C.J., concurring); Id. at 306, 310 (Young, J., concurring). 
159 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9. 
160 Id. 
161 Peter Selb, Supersized Votes: Ballot Length, Uncertainty, and Choice in Direct Legislation Elections, 135 Pub. Choice 319, 
323 (2008). 
162 Id. 
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the status quo.
163
 Instead of placing the burden of overcoming this status quo bias on the 
legislature, the initiative process places this burden on the initiative proponents. Finally, while 
the referendum suspends the effective date of contested legislation, an initiative is not given 
effect until ten days after it is approved by the voters in an election.
164
 As noted by Justice Kelly, 
had the proponents of the referendum in Michigan United Conservation Clubs pursued an 
initiative instead, the disputed act would have been in effect for at least sixteen months before 
being voted on by the people.
165
 
D. Alternative Constructions 
In Michigan “stare decisis is a principle of policy, not an inexorable command.”166 When 
overturning prior decisions, the court considers four factors: “1) whether the earlier case was 
wrongly decided, 2) whether the decision defies “practical workability,” 3) whether reliance 
interests would work an undue hardship, and 4) whether changes in the law or facts no longer 
justify the questioned decision.”167  
A decision to overturn Michigan United Conservation Clubs would be supported by all 
four of these factors. First, considering the numerous factors previously discussed supporting a 
narrower interpretation of the appropriations exemption, a strong argument can be made that it 
was wrongly decided. Second, the decision “defies ‘practical workability”168 because it makes it 
more difficult for referendum proponents to get a petition on the ballot and encourages the 
legislature to shoehorn appropriations into acts which do not require them. Third, overturn of the 
                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9. 
165 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 330 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
166 Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 641 N.W.2d 219, 231 (Mich. 2002). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
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decision would only create an “undue hardship”169 for the legislature in trying to referendum-
proof its legislation. Finally, considering the Legislature’s increasing abuse of the appropriations 
exemption to referendum-proof controversial legislation,
170
 the facts no longer support continued 
adherence to Michigan Untied Conservation Clubs.
171
 
This essay will consider three alternative constructions of the appropriations exemption. 
1. General Appropriations 
The first construction that warrants consideration is the “general appropriations” 
construction of the appropriations exemption. Under this model, the phrase “acts making 
appropriations for state institutions” would refer only to the general appropriation acts described 
in Art. 4, § 31.
172
 Since this interpretation provides the narrowest possible construction of the 
appropriations exemption, it is most in line with the substantive canon supporting liberal 
construction of “constitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct 
legislative voice.”173 Unfortunately, considering that none of the “gas tax” cases involved general 
appropriations acts
174
 and that the phrase “general appropriation” does not appear in Art. 2, § 
9,
175
 the “general appropriations” construction is neither supported by case law nor the text of the 
constitution. 
2. Core Functions 
Another, more persuasive, construction of the appropriations exemption was advanced in 
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Zoe Clark & Rick Pluta, Why Your Vote on a Wolf-hunt Referendum Might Not Matter, MICHIGAN RADIO (Apr.12, 2013), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/why-your-vote-wolf-hunt-referendum-might-not-matter (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
171171 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298. 
172 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9; art. 4, § 31. 
173 Id. at 799-800. 
174 See County Rd. Ass’n, 282 N.W.2d at 774; Riley, 218 N.W.2d at 144; Good Raods Federation, 53 N.W.2d at 481; Moreton, 
216 N.W at 450; Deland, 203 N.W. at 529. 
175 Mich. Const. art 2, § 9. 
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Justice Kelly’s dissent in Michigan United Conservation Clubs.176 Justice Kelly’s argument turns 
on the definition of the word “for” in the phrase “appropriations for state institutions.”177 As 
discussed previously, Justice Kelly believed the majority equated the word “for” in this phrase 
with the word “to.”178 Instead, she understood this word choice to mean that the framers intended 
an appropriation for a state institution be related in some way to the purpose of the institution.
179
  
Accordingly, she interpreted the appropriations exemption to apply only when “the appropriation 
is intended to support the core function of a state institution.”180 Noting that the appropriations at 
issue only supported the “specific substantive provisions of the act,” she concluded that the 
appropriation should not have exempted the act from referendum.
181
 
A number of the factors discussed support Justice Kelly’s “core functions” interpretation.   
Since this construction requires both a determination of a state institution’s “core function” and 
whether the appropriation supports that “core function” in order to find an act exempt from the 
referendum,
182
 it is consistent with the intent of the drafters who wanted to ensure that the 
referendum could not easily be tampered with by the legislature.
183
 Further, since the “gas tax” 
cases “demonstrate that the appropriation exception within art. 2, § 9, was prompted by a fear of 
financial embarrassment,”184 the “core functions” interpretation is consistent with precedent 
because it ensures that the only acts that would cause financial embarrassment are exempt from 
the referendum.
185
 
However, while Justice Kelly’s “core functions” interpretation may be more strongly 
                                                 
176 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 326-27. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 326. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 327 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
181 Id. 
182 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 327. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
183 Michigan Constitutional Convention, Official Record 2392-94, 2928, 2955 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1964) 
184 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 328 (Kelly, J., dissenting); See also Deland, 203 N.W. at 530; Moreton, 
216 N.W. at 453. 
185 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 328-29 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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supported by the precedent and historical record, this does not mean there are not legitimate 
critiques of the interpretation.  In his concurrence, Justice Young argues that Justice Kelly’s 
interpretation inserts too much uncertainty into the determination of whether the exemption 
applies.
186
 He argues that leaving the courts so many open questions – such as “what is a state 
agency’s ‘core function?’” or how large must an appropriation be to support a “core function” – 
will only serve to insert “judges’ personal preferences” into the outcome.187  Similarly, Justice 
Markman shared these concerns that Justice Kelly’s interpretation “would engage the judiciary in 
an exercise far beyond its competence and authority.”188  Accordingly, a reformulation of Justice 
Kelly’s argument may need to address these concerns in order to be adopted by the court. 
3. Existing State Function 
The “existing state function” construction reads the phrase “appropriation for state 
institutions”189 to mean that only acts which include an appropriation to support a state function 
that is being carried out by a state institution at the time of the act’s passage.  Acts that only 
include appropriations that support new functions would still be subject to the referendum. 
Rather than basing its conclusion on a specific individual terms within the appropriations 
exemption, the “existing state function” construction views the appropriations exemption within 
the full context of Article 2, § 9 and the rest of the Michigan Constitution. Reading the 
appropriations exemption language in this full context, and in light of the drafting history, court 
precedent, and other factors, the “existing state function” construction seems to provide the most 
persuasive alternative to the majority’s construction in Michigan United Conservation Clubs.190 
The first, and primary, rule of constitutional construction is Thomas Cooley’s rule of 
                                                 
186 Id. at 310 (Young, J., concurring). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 317 (Markman, J., concurring). 
189 Mich. Const. art. 2, § 9. 
190 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 298. 
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“common understanding,”191 which requires the court to look for the interpretation “most 
obvious” to the general populace who adopted the constitutional language.192 Art. 2, § 9 exempts 
“acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds.”193 In 
trying to decipher this language’s “common understanding,” it must first be noted that several 
phrases within in the referendum exemption clause have been defined by the court.  A “state 
institution” is essentially any state department or state subdivision “which the Legislature had 
delegated or should delegate the exercise of state functions.”194 As noted in Moreton, the 
determination turns on whether the entity carries out a state function.
195
  Further, the exemption 
for acts “to meet deficiencies in state funds” has been found to apply only to acts that address 
“such deficiencies as exist at the time of passage of the Act.”196  Thus, the only phrase in the 
referendum exemption clause not interpreted by the court before Michigan United Conservation 
Clubs is “appropriation for.”   
Rather than interpreting the “appropriation for” phrase in a vacuum, however, it makes 
more sense to interpret the language in its full context. Considering that it is the “state function” 
that makes the “state institution,”197 it follows that an activity is not a “state function” until it is 
carried out by a “state institution.”  Accordingly, an appropriation for a state institution must be 
an appropriation to support a state function currently being carried out by a state institution. For 
instance, all five “gas tax” cases involved appropriations to support existing state functions 
carried out by their respective state institutions.
198
  Further, under the textual canon noscitur a 
sociis, one can read the appropriation exemption to be temporally limited in a similar fashion as 
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the “deficiencies in state funds” exemption was in Kuhn.199 Finally, the constitution’s structure 
also supports the “existing state function” interpretation of the appropriations exemption as it 
would be broader than Article 4, § 31’s “general appropriations” and narrower than Article 4, § 
34’s “bill appropriating money.”200 
Michigan’s second rule of constitutional construction is if the face of the text language 
does not provide a single clear meaning, the court may then consider the circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of the provision and the purposes sought by it in order to clarify the 
text’s meaning.201 These factors also support the “existing state function” construction. In 
Deland, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the appropriations 
exemption is to “enable the state to exercise its various functions free from financial 
embarrassment.”202 Since the “existing state function” construction only subject appropriations 
for proposed state functions, it cannot result in financial embarrassment to the state.  Further, 
since this construction would not allow the legislature to referendum-proof legislation that adds 
or expands state functions, it is consistent with the intent of the constitution’s framers to prevent 
the legislature from using the referendum exemptions to thwart the will of the people.
203
 
Third, when interpreting the constitution, the court must give preference to interpretations 
that avoid creating constitutional invalidities.
204
 Unlike the majority’s interpretation in Michigan 
United Conservation Clubs, the “existing state function” construction does not invalidate the 
people’s check on the legislature. Since it empowers the legislature to referendum-proof 
controversial legislation through mere additions of appropriations, the current interpretation of 
the appropriations exemption essentially makes the availability of the referendum subject to the 
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legislature’s consent.205 The existing state function interpretation, on the other hand, would 
preserve the people’s referendum when the legislature creates new state functions and attaches 
an appropriation.  For example, both P.A. 381 of 2000, the act at issue in Michigan United 
Conservation Clubs, and P.A. 436 of 2012, the Emergency Manager Law, would be subject to 
the referendum under the “existing state function” construction, because the appropriations in 
each only supported new functions proposed under the acts.
206
 
Finally, the existing state functions interpretation would also alleviate Justices Young and 
Markman’s concerns about leaving too much uncertainty in determining whether the 
appropriations exemption applies.
207
 Unlike Justice Kelly’s interpretation, the analysis will not 
require a determination of state institutions’ “core functions” nor will the court need to consider 
the size of appropriations.
208
  All that will be required is a determination of what the act says the 
money is appropriated for.  If the appropriation supports pre-existing state functions, the act will 
be referendum-proof.  If the appropriations within an act are to support new or expanded state 
functions as described in the act, the act is subject to the referendum.   
However, an admitted weakness of the “existing state functions” construction is an 
underlying assumption that Michigan’s single object rule209 would not permit funding for an 
existing function and a new function to be proposed within the same act.  If this is not the case, 
this construction would leave another loophole through which the legislature could referendum-
proof its acts. However, considering that the funding of current state expenses is supposed to be 
included within a general appropriation act
210
 and that amendments to existing acts must fit 
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under the original title of the act,
211
 this assumption seems to be a safe one to make. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
While judicial reconsideration is the less costly method of changing the effect of 
constitutional provisions, it can often be more timely and effective to pursue a constitutional 
amendment.  The current referendum exemption provision states that “[t]he power of referendum 
does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in 
state funds.”212 There are several different ways to amend this language in order to restore the 
referendum – this essay will consider two. 
A. “General Appropriations”  
The first method would be to amend the referendum exemption language so that it is 
facially narrower. In this way, Michigan would follow the lead of states like California, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Nebraska, which have facially narrow appropriations 
exemptions.
213
 Specifically, the amendment proposal could remove the current exemption 
language within Art. 2, § 9 and replace it with phrases explicitly from Art. 4, § 31. As previously 
discussed, an appropriations exemption which limits the exemption to the “general 
appropriations” described in Art. 4, § 31 would allow for the most liberal construction of the 
referendum power while retaining an exemption. To make this change, the exemption language 
would be amended to read – “the power of referendum does not extend to general appropriation 
acts or to acts supplementing appropriations for the current fiscal year's operation.” Accordingly,  
the appropriations exemption would refer only to the large appropriations acts passed as part of 
the yearly budgeting process. 
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B. The North Dakota Model 
The second option for amending Michigan’s referendum would be to model after the 
language within North Dakota’s Constitution.  North Dakota has two primary differences from 
Michigan within its referendum provision. First, North Dakota referendum’s does not have any 
exemptions to its referendum power and instead places limitations on the stay of acts subjected 
to a referendum.
214
 While several other states also do not have referendum exemptions,
215
 North 
Dakota’s Constitution also exempts “emergency measures and appropriations measures for the 
support and maintenance of state departments and institutions” from having their effective date 
suspended due to the submission of a referendum petition.
216
 In this way, North Dakota’s people 
are unrestricted in the types of acts they can bring to a referendum vote and the state cannot be 
financially embarrassed by the mere filing of a referendum petition.  Second, North Dakota’s 
Constitution allows for referendum on portions of acts.
217
 This allows groups advancing a 
referendum to pinpoint specific controversial provisions to subject to a vote of the general 
electorate.  Numerous other states with referendum provisions allow for this sort of provision 
specific referendum votes.
218
 While a change to incorporate either one of these differences into 
the Michigan Constitution would protect the referendum, North Dakota’s language has allowed it 
to become “one of the top five most prolific” users of direct legislative powers.219 
The Voters for Fair Use of the Ballot Referendum, an organization seeking to amend 
Michigan’s referendum, support an amendment that would essentially incorporate North 
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Dakota’s referendum model.220 Their proposed amendment to Art. 2, § 9 (with removals struck 
through and additions in all-caps) reads as follows: 
The power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for state 
institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds and must be invoked in the 
manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final adjournment of the 
legislative session at which the law was enacted. . . .  
 
THE POWER OF REFERENDUM MAY BE INVOKED BY THE PEOPLE 
AGAINST ONE OR MORE PARTS OR SECTIONS OF ANY LAW IN THE 
SAME MANNER IN WHICH SUCH POWER MAY BE INVOKED AGAINST 
A WHOLE LAW. THE FILING OF A REFERENDUM PETITION AGAINST 
ONE OR MORE PARTS OR SECTIONS OF A LAW SHALL NOT DELAY 
THE REMAINDER OF SUCH LAW FROM BECOMING EFFECTIVE. 
 
No law OR PORTION THEREOF as to which the power of referendum properly 
has been invoked shall be effective thereafter unless approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon at the next general election, EXCEPT THAT IF A LAW 
OR PORTION THEREOF AS TO WHICH THE POWER OF REFERENDUM 
HAS BEEN INVOKED CONTAINS APPROPRIATIONS FOR STATE 
INSTITUTIONS OR TO MEET DEFICIENCIES IN STATE FUNDS, SUCH 
APPROPRIATIONS SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE AS SPECIFIED IN THE 
LAW AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE REFERENDUM. . . .  
 
Any law OR PORTION THEREOF submitted to the people by either initiative or 
referendum petition and approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon at any 
election shall take effect 10 days after the date of the official declaration of the 
vote.
221
 
 
While it still makes use of the ambiguous “appropriations for state institutions” language, this 
proposal incorporation of North Dakota’s referendum model makes it a strong alternative to our 
current constitutional language. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The crux of the debate over Michigan’s referendum power is the question of which 
legislative powers should be given priority – the state legislature’s or the direct legislative 
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powers of the general electorate?  By empowering the state legislature to easily referendum-
proof its legislation, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan United Conservation 
Clubs
222
 clearly gives the state legislature’s will greater priority than that of the people. As we 
have seen with the Emergency Manager Law and the resulting crisis in Flint, this subordination 
of the people’s will can have dire consequences.  
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